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INTRODUCTION

With the United States Supreme Court shifting both in its
composition and how it interprets the First Amendment, the
Minnesota Constitution’s provisions on religion and speech are
poised to emerge from the mist. It has happened before. In 1990,
after the Supreme Court reinterpreted the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause, the Minnesota Supreme Court was first to use a
state constitution to retain strict scrutiny as the relevant
1
constitutional standard.
Today, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause may be
ripe for reinterpretation. Justice Clarence Thomas issued three
concurrences in 2004 and 2005 suggesting that the Establishment
2
Clause should not apply to the states. Last term’s conflicting fiveto-four holdings on where counties may post the Ten
Commandments in courthouses adds to the confusion, which likely
will be exacerbated as Justices depart and as some members of
Congress and their constituents call for more religiousness in

1. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990) (departing
from Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 281 (1993) (explaining
that Minnesota was first to “take a stand” against the weakened standard). Maine,
Massachusetts, and Washington followed. See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d
63 (Me. 1992); Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571
(Mass. 1990); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
2. Justice Thomas’s rationales are that states freely endorsed religion before
the nation’s founding and that the Establishment Clause does not protect an
individual right that states are bound to respect under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (urging a “fundamental rethinking of our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence”); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2126 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (observing that text and history suggest that Establishment Clause
does not apply to state governments); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 50-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing that six states had
established religions at nation’s founding). The First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause, which commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion,” U.S. CONST. amend. I, was made applicable to state
governments in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Thomas is
not alone in advocating for Everson’s reversal. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-42 (1998); ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 100-01,
143-45 (1982).
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3

society. As for free speech, the Court struggled last term to define
4
“government speech” and refused to hear a case that could have
helped standardize state and federal laws on when journalists may
5
avoid subpoenas.
The Minnesota Constitution’s provisions that prohibit
religious establishment and ensure self-expression through worship
and speech stand ready to help. But the state constitution often
lies dormant in actions involving speech and establishment of
religion. When it is pled, the state’s courts frequently ignore the
plain language and instead search for “framers’ intent.” In
addition, courts commonly use federal precedent to interpret the
state provisions even though the state and federal constitutional
provisions are markedly different and even though the state Bill of
Rights protected Minnesotans decades before the First Amendment
6
did.
To be sure, it seems inappropriate to use only the state
constitution in many situations, such as when commercial speech
or Internet pornography crosses state or national borders. But in
cases confined to Minnesota, such as those involving protest speech
and nearly all things related to religion, the state constitution is
well-positioned to balance competing interests and to enable
Minnesota community standards to be imposed in Minnesotacentric cases.
The purpose of this Article is to increase awareness of the
Minnesota Constitution’s religion and speech provisions by
providing a practical resource for lawyers and judges who
3. McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005);
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives to Seek
Voters’ Support for Commandments, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A18 (describing
movement to introduce constitutional amendment ensuring school prayer and
public displays of Ten Commandments).
4. Johans v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2064 (2005) (holding 5-4
that beef producers may be compelled to subsidize federal “government speech”
through advertisements).
5. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia
have statutes protecting journalists from forced disclosure of confidential sources
or newsgathering materials. See id. at 978-79 (Sentelle, J., concurring); see also
MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-.025 (2004) (Minnesota’s shield law).
6. It is generally acknowledged that the First Amendment’s free-speech
guarantees were extended to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
and the Amendment’s religion clauses in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977, 1237 (2001).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
08AGGERGAARD.DOC

722

1/14/2006 5:55:11 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2
7

prosecute, defend against, and decide religion and speech cases.
Part II examines the text and history of the state religion and
speech provisions, explains that state action has been required even
when the plain constitutional language does not demand it, and
argues that gauging “framers’ intent” is unwise if not impossible.
Part III discusses cases related to the state constitution’s provisions
on establishment of religion, particularly in the school-funding
context.
Part IV examines the well-developed “freedom of
conscience” protections and explains when jurisdiction and
standing are found not to infringe on religious exercise in cases
involving churches. Part V surveys the state constitution’s speech
and press protections, which consistently have been interpreted to
parallel the First Amendment.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND APPLICATIONS
A. Relevant Constitutional Texts and History
States may enact constitutional protections stronger than what
the United States Constitution ensures, and state supreme courts
may interpret their constitutions in any way that does not violate
8
federal law. However, “the state may not raise its constitutional
protection for a particular civil liberty so far above the federal floor
that it bumps against the federal floor for some other competing
9
civil right . . . .” For example, if the Minnesota Supreme Court
were to hold that protesters had a state constitutional right to
protest on private property, it would risk violating the property
owner’s First Amendment right against sponsoring speech with
10
which the owner does not agree.
7. The author is privileged to augment the practice-oriented materials in
which the state religion and speech provisions are examined. See MARY JANE
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002)
[hereinafter MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION]; John M. Baker, The
Minnesota Constitution As a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause of Action, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (1994); Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota
Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist,” 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 56-57 (1984);
Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 287 (1994) [hereinafter Morrison, Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution].
8. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981);
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19 (7th ed. 2004).
9. John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 234 (1994).
10. John Devlin, Constructing an Alternate to “State Action” as a Limit on State
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Most of the Minnesota Constitution’s provisions related to
religion and speech are found in article I, the Bill of Rights. Article
I, section 3 reads:
The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and
all persons may freely speak, write and publish their
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
11
of such right.
12
This language is original to the Minnesota Constitution of 1857.
13
Two-thirds of state constitutions have similar language. Unlike
the First Amendment, article I, section 3 anticipates that a speaker
may be punished and on its face does not require state action.
Article I, section 16, the freedom of conscience clause, reads:
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not
deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the
people. The right of every man to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be
infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend,
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor
shall any control of or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by
law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state,
nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological
14
seminaries.
This language also is unchanged from 1857 and its origins are
traced to the New York Constitution of 1777, which predates the
15
federal Bill of Rights by fourteen years.
While some state
constitutions broadly protect “all actions stemming from religious
Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique, and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819,
820, 826 n.30 (1990); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (holding that private parade organizers need not
include gay contingent because parade as a whole is expressive and the organizers
have “autonomy to choose the content”).
11. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 35.
12. Id.
13. State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 589
N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
14. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
15. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.,
concurring).
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conviction,” those in Minnesota and New York are tailored toward
16
protecting “worship.” It is common for state religion clauses to
17
deny protections for practices that violate “peace and safety.”
Article I, section 17 prohibits conditioning public-office
candidacies, voter eligibility, and judicial witness competency on
religious belief:
No religious test or amount of property shall be required
as a qualification for any office of public trust in the state.
No religious test or amount of property shall be required
as a qualification of any voter at any election in this state;
nor shall any person be rendered incompetent to give
evidence in any court of law or equity in consequence of
18
his opinion upon the subject of religion.
19
This section is substantively unchanged since 1857 and its
20
religion-oriented provisions rarely litigated.
Although not in the Minnesota Bill of Rights, article XIII,
section 2 is inseparable from this Article’s analysis. It reads:
In no case shall any public money or property be
16. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1456, 1460 (1990); see also RJ&L
Religious Liberty Archive, State Constitutions, http://www.churchstatelaw.com/
stateconstitutions (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (compiling state constitutional
provisions on religion).
17. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1464. In a recent article, Utah Supreme
Court Chief Justice Christine M. Durham observed that although the peace-andsafety clauses sometimes are seen as restricting religious liberty, they “are more
accurately interpreted as restrictions on state power.” Christine M. Durham, What
Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitutional Religion Clauses,
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 359 (2004).
18. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 17.
19. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 128.
20. It appears that the Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed article I,
section 17 in the religion context only once. In State v. Peterson, the court
affirmed, excluding evidence that a trial witness did not believe in God. 208 N.W.
761, 764, 167 Minn. 216, 222-23 (1926). In her treatise on the Minnesota
Constitution, Professor Mary Jane Morrison references “unexplored tension”
between Peterson and In re Collection of Delinquent Real Property Taxes, 530 N.W.2d
200, 205 (Minn. 1995), where the Minnesota Supreme Court applied a “subjective
test” to hold that an entity was not a church for tax-exemption purposes under
statute or article X, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution. Morrison observes
that “probable resolution of this tension” may be found by concluding that
a person may not be excluded from being a witness on account of her
religious beliefs, but her beliefs may be subject of inquiry for credibility
purposes should she take the stand to testify, at least when she is
testifying in self-interest about being entitled to favorable tax treatment
because of being a religious believer.
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 128-29.
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appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein
the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular
Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or
21
taught.
This section’s origins are traced to an 1877 constitutional
22
It is sometimes characterized as among the antiamendment.
Catholic “Blaine Amendments” that states adopted after
Congressman James G. Blaine failed at amending the federal
23
constitution in 1876 to prohibit aid to sectarian schools.
These provisions, along with the Minnesota Constitution’s
24
Preamble, were for many decades the sole constitutional
25
protections related to Minnesotans’ speech and religion rights.
Yet for most of Minnesota’s statehood, the provisions have lain
largely dormant as courts held that individual rights were inferior
to the state’s police power. Ultimately, Minnesota’s failure to
protect speech liberties under state law prompted the United States
Supreme Court to incorporate the First Amendment’s speech
26
clause through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
21. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
22. MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 292. In
Locke v. Davey, the United States Supreme Court held that similar language in the
Washington Constitution does not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. 540 U.S. 712, 719, 725 (2004) (examining WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
23. Craig Westover, Constitutionality Is a False Issue, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Feb. 22, 2005, at 6B (“Article 13, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution was born
in bigotry”); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(Thomas, J.) (“This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.”). The failed
federal Blaine Amendment read:
No state shall make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State, for the support of the public schools or derived from any
public fund therefor, not any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or
lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38
n.2 (1992) (citing 4 CONG. REC. 5453 (1876)). Professor Green observes that the
Blaine Amendment “does not fit neatly into a modern-day schemata.” Id. at 41.
Nevertheless, he cites authority indicating that the amendment was targeted
toward Catholics who sought public money for schools they had established to
counter “obvious evangelical Protestant overtones to public education.” Id.
24. “We, the people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil
and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.” MINN.
CONST. pmbl.
25. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 56-57.
26. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (under First and
Fourteenth Amendments, invalidating Minnesota law permitting “nuisance”
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After incorporation, state courts essentially ceded power to
27
This was
enforce individual rights to the federal courts.
particularly true from the mid-1950s through the 1960s as Chief
Justice Earl Warren steered the Supreme Court through landmark
28
civil rights and First Amendment cases. One was New York Times v.
Sullivan, which limited use of state defamation law to punish
29
speech about public officials. Another was Sherbert v. Verner, which
held state laws restricting religious free exercise to the strictest
30
scrutiny.
After Sherbert, a “subtle shift of emphasis in the state
courts from state to federal constitutional law is observable,”
including in Minnesota where “there was no longer any mention of
the state constitution; it had, in effect, vanished from the
[Minnesota Supreme Court] opinions’ texts and presumably from
31
the court’s consideration.” The power of federal strict scrutiny
32
“pushed state constitutional texts to the margins,” and “state
constitutional analysis of free exercise claims was all but abandoned
in the thirty years following the Supreme Court’s decision in
33
Sherbert v. Verner.”
However, by 1977, the Supreme Court’s orientation toward
individual liberties had weakened, and Justice William Brennan
wrote a Harvard Law Review article urging states to employ the “font
of individual liberties” in their state constitutions and not to view

newspapers to be shut down); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (criticizing Minnesota law that prohibited antiwar
speech).
27. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 382 (1980); Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts
and First Amendment Freedoms, 5 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642 (1951); see also
Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 73 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Mass. 1947) (observing that
United States Supreme Court had occupied “the field” of free-speech law such that
it would be “academic and futile” to examine Massachusetts constitution); Glover
v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council, 10 N.W.2d 481, 482, 215 Minn. 533, 535
(1943) (“decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States control decision in
the instant case” involving labor pickets of nonlabor job site).
28. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 61; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 1, 35, 66 (1998).
29. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. Carmella, supra note 1, at 298.
32. Id.
33. Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Clauses of Their
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV.
1017, 1019 (1994). States traditionally were “far more comfortable” developing
state constitutional precedent on religious establishment claims. Carmella, supra
note 1, at 319; Durham, supra note 17, at 362.
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federal decisions as “dispositive of questions regarding rights
34
guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law”:
Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well
to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for
only if they are found to be logically persuasive and wellreasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies
underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they
properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when
interpreting counterpart state guarantees. I suggest to the
bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state
courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also
35
to raise the state constitutional questions.
State courts were then “deluged” with state constitutional
36
claims, many related to search and seizure. Few were related to
37
speech —reflective, perhaps, of the United States Supreme Court’s
38
aversion to a “paternalistic” approach to restricting speech. But
the Minnesota Constitution’s protections for individual rights lay
largely dormant. This prompted Terrence Fleming (a former
Minnesota Supreme Court law clerk) and Jack Nordby (a Twin
Cities attorney and eventual Hennepin County judge) to write a
1984 Hamline Law Review article aptly titled The Minnesota Bill of
39
Rights: Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist.
The authors criticized
Minnesota attorneys for rarely invoking the Minnesota Bill of
Rights and encouraged the bench to meet its “obligation” to
40
employ the Minnesota Constitution independently.
Then, in 1990, the Warren Court’s opinion in Sherbert v.
41
Verner was largely overruled as the Court held in Employment
42
Division v. Smith that strict scrutiny no longer controlled most free
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491, 502 (1977).
35. Id. at 502.
36. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1031 (2003).
37. Devlin, supra note 10, at 831-34.
38. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 585-86 (2004) (explaining that since 1976,
antipaternalism—the idea that government is ill-equipped to control speech for
citizens’ own good—“has percolated in most of the Court’s commercial speech
cases . . . [and] has seeped into other areas of First Amendment law”).
39. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7.
40. Id. at 53, 57.
41. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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43

exercise claims.
“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith, interest in state constitutional protections for religious
44
liberty surged.” In light of Smith, the Court remanded State v.
Hershberger, a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court had held
that Amish buggy drivers were exempted from certain traffic laws
45
under the First Amendment. On remand, the Minnesota court
became first in the nation to “take a stand” against Smith by
employing the state constitution to preserve strict scrutiny in free
46
exercise claims.
After Hershberger, the Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed
47
independent state-constitutional standards for search and seizure,
48
49
equal protection, abortion funding, and right to counsel after
50
drunken driving arrests. In 1994, the William Mitchell Law Review
51
published its first issue dedicated solely to state constitutional law.
But the speech provision remained dormant. While a handful of
43. Id. at 883-85 (distinguishing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
The Supreme Court has retained strict scrutiny for laws that purposefully restrict
religious practices, such as those prohibiting animal sacrifice. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
44. Durham, supra note 17, at 366.
45. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990) (remanding State v.
Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989)).
46. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990); Carmella, supra
note 1, at 281.
47. Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. 1994)
(departing from Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), a “radical
departure” from Minnesota precedent prohibiting temporary traffic road blocks);
In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780-83 (Minn.1993) (departing from
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), a “sharp departure” from Minnesota
precedent on when seizure occurs). In recent years, article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution has assumed independence from the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, even though the provisions are textually
identical. See State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005) (departing from
federal cases on when a drug-detection dog may be employed to “sniff” outside a
rented self-storage locker); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367-71 (Minn.
2004) (departing from Fourth Amendment on squad-car detentions and police
officers’ requests for consent to search); State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19
(Minn. 2003) (holding that police officers may not expand the scope of a routine
traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Wiegand,
645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002) (holding that reasonable suspicion is required
before police officers may seize and perform a drug-detecting dog sniff on a motor
vehicle).
48. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
49. Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1995)
(rejecting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)).
50. Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Minn.
1991).
51. 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227-588 (1994).
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state supreme courts adopted independent free speech protections
52
during the 1990s, the Minnesota Supreme Court signaled several
times during the decade that article I, section 3 could offer
protections greater than the First Amendment, but to date has not
53
so held.
Still, the renewed interest in the state Bill of Rights prompted
now-Judge Nordby to write of a “renaissance of constitutional
recognition” in a Foreword he penned to a 2002 treatise on the
54
Minnesota Constitution. Similar stirrings are being felt across the
nation as state speech and religion clauses receive increased
55
attention amid the unsettled First Amendment landscape.
According to Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Christine M.
Durham, “generally, state constitutions currently afford a friendlier
56
venue for litigants in religious liberty cases.”
Retired Oregon
Supreme Court Justice Hans A. Linde urges practitioners and
judges to heed Hershberger and the primacy of state constitutional
law: “the Minnesota story repeated what often happens when state
courts have decided federal issues ahead of state issues: delay,
needless costs, and often Supreme Court pronouncements that
57
prove to have been unnecessary.”

52. State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 753-54 (Conn. 1995); Price v. State, 622
N.E.2d 954, 956-57, 961, 964-65 (Ind. 1993); Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 1281 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); Moser v.
Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284, 1285, 1287-88 (Or. 1993); Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d
1, 8 (Tex. 1993).
53. State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 799, 801 (Minn. 1999); Minn. League
of Credit Unions v. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, 486 N.W.2d 399, 403-04 (Minn.
1992); State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992); Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992).
54. Jack Nordby, Foreword to MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 7, at xviii.
55. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Expressive Liberties in the State Courts: Their
Permissible Reach and Sanctioned Restraints, 67 ALB. L. REV. 655, 688 (2004)
(observing that while state constitutional contributions to freedom of speech
issues “remain marginal in comparison to the multitude of First Amendment
precedents,” they are a “welcome development” and “contribute, however
sparingly, to the overall body of expressive liberties”); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free
Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and Judicial Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059,
1059 (2000) (observing that state constitutions’ religious clauses “merit[]
attention” given “the unsettled state of the guidelines that have marked the
religion clauses of the [federal] Bill of Rights”).
56. Durham, supra note 17, at 370.
57. Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215,
218 (1992).
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B. State Action
By its “make no law” language, the First Amendment is
triggered only by state action—when a government actor has
58
infringed a person’s religious or speech liberties. Similarly, by its
prohibition against “public money or property” going toward
religious schools, article XIII, section 2 of the Minnesota
59
Constitution plainly requires state action.
But by its plain
60
language, article I, section 3 does not require state action. And
apart from article I, section 16’s prohibition against “preference . . .
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship,”
the freedom of conscience clause also contains no state action
61
requirement. Presumably, anyone who infringes a Minnesotan’s
right to speak, write, publish, worship, or believe may be said to
have violated the state constitution.
As applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, the
speech and religion clauses both require state action. In HillMurray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, a 1992 case
that built on the strict scrutiny rule in Hershberger, the supreme
court held that the relevant inquiry was whether a “state
62
regulation” burdened religious exercise. In State v. Wicklund, the
court’s most recent decision interpreting article I, section 3, it was
observed that the state constitution “does not accord affirmative
rights to citizens against each other; its provisions are triggered
63
only by state action.”
At issue in Wicklund was whether state constitutional rights of
fur protesters (and accused criminal trespassers) were violated
when they were denied access to the privately owned but publicly

58. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265 (1964) (finding state action in state court’s application of state law to a civil
action between private parties).
59. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
60. Id. art. I, § 3.
61. Id. art. I, § 16.
62. 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
63. 589 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1999) (directing courts to gauge “whether
the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs”). When private
action is at issue, state action under the Minnesota Constitution may be “found
only where there is either a symbiotic relationship or a sufficiently close nexus
between the government and the private entity so that the ‘power, property and
prestige’ of the state has been in fact placed behind the challenged conduct.” Id.
at 802 (citing Brennan v. Minneapolis Soc’y for the Blind, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 515,
528 (Minn. 1979)).
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financed Mall of America. At the time, courts in California, New
Jersey, Washington, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Colorado had
used state constitutions to ensure speakers’ access to private
shopping malls, amid the United States Supreme Court’s
65
acquiescence. However, most courts confronting such claims had
66
sided with the mall owners.
The Minnesota Supreme Court
distinguished the Colorado decision as one involving activities “far
more of a governmental nature” than the Mall of America case
because government agencies had maintained offices in the
Colorado mall, and police officers patrolled there during business
67
hours. Accordingly, it appears uncertain whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court would deviate from requiring state action for
article I, section 3 claims. But it is worth noting that the Mall of
America is now patrolled by municipal police officers and contains
68
a publicly funded light-rail station.
The court in Wicklund did not mention that Wisconsin had
struggled with the identical issue twelve years earlier. In Jacobs v.
Major, a mall-access case in which dancers sought to depict nuclear
warfare, a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that the
state’s free-speech provision, which is nearly identical to
69
Minnesota’s, is triggered only by state action. But three dissenting
justices argued that the speech provision’s plain language does not
require state action and astutely observed that the section
immediately preceding it—which, as in Minnesota, forbids slavery
and involuntary servitude with no mention of state action—would

64. Id. at 794-95, 803.
65. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff’d,
447 U.S. 74 (1980); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991);
Cologne v. Westfarms Ass’n, 442 A.2d 461, 483 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982); N. J. Coal.
Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 771 (N.J.
1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432
A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981); Alderwood Assoc. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d
108, 115-16 (Wash. 1981); see also Devlin, supra note 10, at 902 n.9; Note, Private
Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 188 (1980)
(arguing that state constitutions provide right of access to privately held public
forums for expressive activity).
66. Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern
Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 32 (1999).
67. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 802 n.8 (analyzing Bock, 819 P.2d 55).
68. See Mall of America: Guest Services, http://www.mallofamerica.com/
about_moa_guest_services.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); see also Alexander, supra
note 66, at 1 (observing that malls represent “the downtown of yesteryear,” but
that expression is controlled).
69. Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 846 (Wis. 1987).
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70

be enforced irrespective of who is the actor.
Commentator John Devlin has proposed a framework apart
from state action for imposing state constitutional speech
limitations on corporations, associations, and similar entities
“where the text and history of a particular constitutional provision
fail to show that it was intended to bind only the state
71
government.”
Devlin suggests imposing liability when (1) the
alleged infringer was not an individual “acting within a sphere of
personal autonomy,” (2) a “significant right” is at issue, and (3)
72
competing interests are balanced. Perhaps such a framework will
take root if governments continue balancing financial incentives
for traditionally public spaces to become privately controlled.
C. Gauging Framers’ Intent
Examining the United States Constitution to reflect “the
public intentions of those who drafted and ratified it” is attractive
73
to some and unworkable to others. As Cass R. Sunstein observed
74
recently: “[w]hy should we be governed by people long dead?”
Gauging framers’ intent as to the Minnesota Constitution borders
75
on futile. Well-documented is the chaos in 1857 when Democrats
and Republicans held separate constitutional conventions that
produced two documents, which were resolved by a conference
76
committee that left little paper trail. Given that the Minnesota
70. Id. at 852 (Abrahamson and Bablitch, JJ., and Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
71. Devlin, supra note 10, at 825.
72. Id. at 901.
73. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 10 (2002). “After
thorough and careful historical research, scholars disagree on the original
meaning of almost every important constitutional provision.” Id. at 14.
74. Cass R. Sunstein, Fighting for the Supreme Court: How Right-Wing Judges Are
Transforming the Constitution, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 31, 37.
75. But see MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at
14 (asserting that “drafters’ intent is key to [Minnesota] constitutional
interpretation”).
Minnesota courts are receptive to constitutional interpretations using
history of the constitutional text, including drafters’ views of that text,
views of past legislatures as reflected in earlier statutes, and views of the
courts not only to that provision but also as to related federal provisions
when those views fairly clearly result from state reasoning rather than
federal mandates.
Id. at 15.
76. WILLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 79-82,
98 (1921); MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 1; see
also Douglas A. Hedin, The Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s
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Constitution was restructured in 1974, today’s commentators do
not even agree on how many constitutions Minnesota had, let alone
77
how to decipher original meaning.
Nevertheless, the state’s
courts occasionally decide state constitutional issues on “framers’
78
intent.” In so doing, the courts risk ignoring that the Minnesota
Bill of Rights applied to state residents well before most of the
federal Bill of Rights did, and that state constitutional clauses
79
influenced creation of the First Amendment.
A postmortem of State v. Wicklund helps demonstrate why
“framers’ intent” is a red herring. The case began in Hennepin
County District Court, where none other than Judge Nordby
denied the alleged protesters’ motion to dismiss but nevertheless
issued a memorandum observing that the publicly financed Mall of
America was bound to respect free-speech rights under article I,
80
section 3.
Judge Nordby explained that the plain language of
article I, section 3 “affirmatively grants plenary rights” while the
First Amendment does not, and he posited that the Minnesota
Constitution’s framers were “intimately familiar” with the federal
speech clause and found its plain-language limitation to
81
Congressional actions “wanting.”
In holding that article I, section 3 does not apply to expressive
conduct at the privately owned mall, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals observed that Judge Nordby had failed to delineate “the
Constitutional Past, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 243-44 (2003) (doubting that
originalism has a place in Minnesota constitutional analysis given the
“dysfunctional” constitutional convention in 1857); Russell Pannier, Essay,
Abraham’s Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265, 293
(2002) (criticizing Minnesota Supreme Court for mixing originalism with
nonoriginalism); Simonett, supra note 9, at 239 (characterizing originalism as “not
a particularly helpful approach” to the Minnesota Constitution).
77. See Comments on the Restructured Constitution of 1974, in 1 MINN. STAT. ANN.
129 (West 1976) (explaining that restructuring was not a “revision”); compare
MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 1, 12 (Minnesota
has one constitution continuously in effect since 1857 and is among the nation’s
oldest), with Nordby, Foreword to MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 7, at xvii (Minnesota has two constitutions), and Morrison, Introduction
to the Minnesota Constitution, supra note 7, at 287 (“Minnesota has three state
constitutions.”) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Winters v. Kiffmeyer, 650 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 2002)
(assessing what “framers” intended by judicial-appointment provision in state
constitution).
79. Durham, supra note 17, at 354.
80. State v. Wicklund, Nos. 96-042987, 96-044022, 96-043061, 96-043228, 1997
WL 426209, at *25 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. July 24, 1997).
81. Id. at *7.
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[state constitution] framers’ reason for departing from the
82
language of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” And
in affirming the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court
identified its “first consideration” as being “whether the significant
difference in terminology between the federal and state free speech
provisions suggests that the framers of the Minnesota Constitution
intended the free speech protection to be more broadly applied
83
than its federal counterpart.”
The appellate courts’ approaches can be criticized. First, the
courts did not follow precedent suggesting that article I, section 3’s
84
plain language be examined before history.
Second, the First
Amendment’s speech clause was not made applicable to the states
85
until 1925 or later, decades after article I, section 3 was adopted.
As Judge Nordby observed in his memorandum on remand, the
issue was not why article I, section 3 should be read differently than
86
the First Amendment, but “why it should be read the same.”
The original intent behind article I, section 16 might be easier
to gauge, given that the Minnesota Constitution’s Preamble
expresses “grateful[ness] to God for our civil and religious

82. State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 589
N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
83. State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 798-99.
84. See State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992) (holding that
article I, section 3 case can be resolved “in the plain language of the
constitution”); see also Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d
293, 311 (Minn. 2000) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (observing that the
“majority’s analysis ignores the constitution’s plain language”).
85. See sources cited supra note 6. In Wicklund, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s “brief historical journey” revealed that the “framers” were concerned with
libel suits, not with protest speech, and that article I, section 3 was “copied from
elsewhere”—facts that, according to the court, compelled the conclusion that
article I, section 3 was to be read no more broadly than the First Amendment. 589
N.W.2d at 799. The court of appeals similarly criticized the district court for
failing to identify “the framers’ reason for departing from the language of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” 576 N.W.2d at 756.
86. State v. Wicklund, Nos. 96-042987, 96-044022, 96-043061, 96-043228, 1997
WL 426209, at *10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000). In his twenty-sixpage memorandum, Judge Nordby also observed that the State had improperly
appealed from a ruling in which it had prevailed on the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and he characterized his constitutional observations as “unimportant
dictum [that] has now been transformed into law.” Id. at *1, *3. “The Supreme
Court’s opinion betrays a lack of interest in, knowledge of, and respect for the
Minnesota Constitution.” Id. at *13. Ultimately, in a bench trial, Judge Nordby
found the protesters not guilty because the State had not proven criminal intent.
See id. at *22-26.
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liberty . . . .” In addition, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which
applied to Minnesota before statehood, directs that Minnesota’s
future laws be based on “civil and religious liberty,” that no one
should be “molested on account of his mode of worship or
religious sentiments[,]” and that “[r]eligion, morality, and
88
knowledge . . . shall be forever encouraged.” Still, determining
whether the “framers” intended for article I, section 16 to be
stronger than the First Amendment is imprudent because “the free
exercise clause at the federal level was itself modeled on free
89
exercise provisions in the various state constitutions.”
Oregon’s Justice Linde observes that because state
constitutions have much in common with common law, originalism
should yield to a more “institutional” approach that “derives
constitutional law from the practice of judicial review rather than
90
judicial review from constitutional law.” “Fidelity to a constitution
need not mean narrow literalism. Most state bills of rights leave
adequate room for modern applications, as well as for comparing
91
similar guarantees elsewhere.” But even under such an approach,
state courts are likely to continue importing federal standards for
92
their state constitutional analyses.
Minnesota courts must not ignore the “clear meaning” of the
93
state constitution’s religion and speech clauses, but must confront

87. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (citing Preamble
as among history that “supports a broad protection for religious freedom in
Minnesota”).
88. ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 9; NORTHWEST ORD. §§ 13, 14, arts. 1-2,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nworder.htm. But relying on the
Northwest Ordinance too much for today’s interpretations might be unwise, given
that the document based legislative representation on the number of “free male
inhabitants” in a district. NORTHWEST ORD. § 9.
89. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1485. “[S]tate constitutions provide the
most direct evidence of the original understanding [of freedom of religion], for it
is reasonable to infer that those who drafted and adopted the first amendment
assumed the term ‘free exercise of religion’ meant what it had meant in their
states.” Id. at 1456.
90. Linde, supra note 57, at 226-28.
91. Id. at 228.
92. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wis. 1998); see also infra
notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
93. See Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 843-44 (Wis. 1987) (observing, in a
case involving the Wisconsin Constitution’s speech clause, that the court “has the
power, perhaps the duty, to make sure that the protections of our state
constitution remain relevant in light of changing conditions, emerging needs and
acceptable changes in social values, but such action must be consistent with the
clear meaning of the constitution”).
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the language with analyses relevant to today’s society without rigid
94
adherence to original intent. On this point, State v. Hamm is
instructive.
In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that “framers” of the Minnesota Constitution intended
for a criminal defendant to be afforded a twelve-person jury, but
conceded that “[w]e would no longer interpret the word ‘men,’ for
example, to apply only to free white men, despite the framers’
95
intent.”
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
A. Commandments and Crèches
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause commands that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
96
religion.” When first made applicable to the states in Everson v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court observed that the “First
97
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.” The
Clause’s “clearest command”—as articulated in Larson v. Valente,
where the Court invalidated a Minnesota law that distinguished
religions that receive half their contributions from nonmembers—
is that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
98
over another.”
But the wall between church and state is hardly impregnable,
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, in Justice Thomas’s
99
estimation, “in hopeless disarray.”
Several constitutional tests
have emerged, sometimes producing results bordering on the
absurd: a government-sponsored holiday display that includes baby
Jesus is okay, but only if room is left for reindeer, clowns, and
100
elephants.
In 2005, the Supreme Court obscured the analysis
even more by issuing fact-specific, conflicting holdings on how and

94. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
95. Id. at 385-86 (examining article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution
(amended 1988)).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
98. 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
99. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 n.1 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
100. See Allegheny County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 685 (1984).
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where a county is permitted to display the Ten Commandments in
101
courthouses.
102
Apart from school-funding issues,
the Minnesota Supreme
Court has had little opportunity to remedy the disarray with the
state constitution. Cases interpreting article I, section 16 are of
little precedential value. In an 1898 opinion by Justice William
Mitchell, the court upheld a no work-on-Sundays law as consistent
103
with the state’s police power to enact a “sanitary measure.” In its
1927 opinion in Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virginia, the
court held that it would be a “strained construction” to interpret
article I, section 16 as prohibiting daily Bible readings in public
104
school.
In an unpublished decision from 1997, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals invoked federal precedent to hold that a
Minnesota statute criminalizing car sales on Sundays does not
constitute impermissible establishment of religion under article I,
105
section 16.
In 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court avoided the
state constitutional establishment issue while examining a rule
requiring Minnesota attorneys to attend “elimination of bias”
seminars including panels such as “Understanding Islam and
Working with Muslim Clients” and “Enhancing Your Knowledge of
106
Somali and Islamic Cultures.”
101. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (maintaining Ten
Commandments monument outside courthouse permissible); McCreary County v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (posting Ten Commandments
inside courthouse impermissible).
102. See discussion infra Part III.B.
103. State v. Petit, 77 N.W. 225, 226, 74 Minn. 376, 379 (1898), aff’d, 177 U.S.
164 (1900).
104. 214 N.W. 18, 20, 171 Minn. 142, 148 (1927). “What more natural than
turning to that Book for moral precepts which for ages has been regarded by the
majority of the peoples of the most civilized nations as the fountain of moral
teachings?” Id. at 18, 171 Minn. at 144. Kaplan remains good law but never has
been cited as persuasive authority. See Michael K. Steenson, Essay, Pledging
Allegiance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 747, 772, 775 (2003) (characterizing Kaplan as
“simply of historical interest” and not a “standard for current cases”).
105. Kirt v. Humphrey, No. C1-96-2614, 1997 WL 561249, at *5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 9, 1997) (upholding section 168.275 of Minnesota Statutes under
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961)). “Although the genesis of Sunday closing laws was religious, over time
such laws have evolved into secular laws devoid of their once religious bases.” Id.
106. In re Rothenberg, 676 N.W.2d 283, 292 (Minn. 2004). The court held
that the requirement survived First Amendment Establishment Clause scrutiny,
and then characterized the article I, section 16 inquiry as involving only an
ungrounded claim involving free exercise of religion, making no mention of
article I, section 16’s prohibition against preference for religious establishment.
Id. at 293-94.
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The slate is blank in Minnesota as to whether placing the Ten
Commandments or similar religious symbols on public property
violates the state constitution. This is not so in several other
107
states.
California and Colorado have invoked their state
108
constitutions to forbid religious displays from public property,
while Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma have held to the
109
contrary.
The Oregon Supreme Court undertook a rather
tortured inquiry in 1969 and 1976 before essentially holding that
the question is best resolved under the First Amendment and not
110
the state constitution.
In interpreting language nearly identical
to article I, section 16’s prohibition against “any preference . . . to
any religious establishment or mode of worship,” a divided
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a city’s annual Christmas
display was permissible because “[t]he display is not a place of
worship, it is not a ‘ministry,’ [and] no ‘preference’ is given to ‘any
111
religious establishments’ or modes of worship[.]”
With the First Amendment’s establishment clause on unsure
107. See generally Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause:
Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA.
L. REV. 625 (1985) (surveying litigation involving state constitution establishment
clauses).
108. Fox v. City of L.A., 587 P.2d 663, 663-65 (Cal. 1978) (holding that “huge
cross” illuminated on city hall during Christmas and Easter violated state
constitutional provision forbidding laws “respecting an establishment of religion”);
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 666, 671, 675 (Colo. 1983)
(holding that plaintiffs had established prima facie case that city-sponsored crèche
violated state constitution).
109. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833, 834-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), rev.
denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (rejecting nonChristian taxpayer’s claim that state constitution forbade cross on county
courthouse, and resolving case under First Amendment); State v. Morrison, 57 So.
2d 238, 240-47 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that state constitution permits
religious statue on public property, and observing that there was no federal
question); Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Okla. 1972) (holding
that a fifty-foot cross on city fairgrounds did not go toward “use, benefit or
support” of religious institution).
110. Lowe v. City of Eugene, 451 P.2d 117, 122 (Or. 1969) (holding that cross
on city land was permissible under state and federal constitutions), argued on reh’g,
withdrawn, 459 P.2d 222, 224 (Or. 1969). After the city’s voters accepted the cross
as part of a war memorial, the Oregon Supreme Court held that “changed
circumstances” and newly enacted federal precedent necessitated that the cross be
allowed, apparently under the First Amendment. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 340, 342, 346 (Or. 1976).
111. King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671, 683 (Wis. 1994). Two
dissenting justices wrote that religious rights would be “enhanced, not diminished”
by holding the city’s display improper under the state constitution. Id. at 688
(Heffernan, C.J., and Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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footing, litigants may be emboldened to revisit article I, section 16’s
112
Given the dearth of
prohibition against religious establishment.
state constitutional law on article I, section 16’s establishment
clause, state courts are apt to use First Amendment precedent as a
113
starting point.
But they should not ignore cases from other
courts that have interpreted language substantially similar or
identical to Minnesota’s establishment clause. For cases that fail to
reach outside Minnesota’s borders—as would be the situation in
most if not all establishment-of-religion situations—it seems
appropriate for Minnesota courts to develop state constitutional
case law that respects the rights of religious establishments but also
the desires of Minnesotans who wish not to support such
establishments.
B. Religion, Schools, and Taxes
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not been idle in
interpreting article XIII, section 2, which prohibits public money
from being used to benefit religious-school education. Two cases
from the 1970s suggest that courts should parse the constitutional
language closely to ensure that the state’s interest in education is
not trumped by “incidental” benefits to religious schools.
In Minnesota Higher Education Facility Authority v. Hawk, the
court upheld public refinancing of debts that three private colleges
with religious ties had incurred, observing that there was no
114
expenditure of “public money” within article XIII, section 2.
In
Americans United Incorporated as Protestants and Other Americans United
112. See Wendtland, supra note 107, at 653 (concluding that Supreme Court’s
“shift from strong disapproval of church-state entanglement to a relative
accommodation has left considerable room for the states to maintain a wall of
separation through their own constitutions”).
113. See id. (“[S]tate courts consult federal [Establishment Clause] precedent
while creating independent tests that promote particular state constitutional
values.”).
114. 232 N.W.2d 106, 112, 305 Minn. 97, 107 (1975). The court noted that
among the three colleges, only Bethel College was owned and operated by a
church body (the Baptist General Conference) and that the only religious ties to
the other institutions, St. Mary’s College and the College of St. Theresa, involved
requirements that one-third of the colleges’ boards of trustees be from certain
religious orders. Id. at 108 nn. 9-11, 305 Minn. at 100 nn. 9-11. Refinancing was
described as aid of a “very special sort” that resulted in no “financial burden” to
the state and “no grant or appropriation of public money nor a loan of public
credit. Id. at 111-12, 305 Minn. at 105-06 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745
n.7 (1973); Cal. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 521 (Cal. 1974);
Opinion of the Justices, 236 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1968)).
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for Separation of Church and State v. Independent School District No. 622,
the court held that using public money to transport children to
sectarian schools was on “the verge of unconstitutionality,” but was
permissible because busing does not “directly involve support of the
educational process” within article XIII, section 2’s prohibition
115
against “support” for religious schools.
The court held that
public busing “serves a legitimate secular purpose in promoting the
safety and welfare of children required to attend school under our
compulsory attendance law,” and that any benefits to religion were
116
“purely incidental and inconsequential.”
In 1993, the Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted Americans
United as permitting “indirect and incidental” benefits to religious
schools, holding that a church-affiliated college could be
reimbursed from public funds for courses that high school students
117
took as part of the Post-Secondary Enrollment Options Act. Four
years later, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Americans
United and the state court of appeals case to decide as a “matter of
law” that an arrangement between a school district and a member
of a religious order did not violate article I, section 16 or article
118
The church member had purchased a school
XIII, section 2.
building and sought to have a school district “lease space” there
and operate a public school, on condition that the school district
provide a teacher and, in accordance with the religious order’s
teachings, not use electronics, including computers. A divided
Eighth Circuit held that the arrangement did not violate the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, and then affirmed
119
constitutionality under the state constitution. The Eighth Circuit
observed that although the “[Minnesota] establishment clauses
prohibit both ‘benefits’ and ‘support’ to schools teaching
distinctive religious doctrines,” the arrangement was proper
115. 179 N.W.2d 146, 155-56, 288 Minn. 196, 213-15 (1970). At the time, the
relevant state constitutional language was numbered as article VIII, section 2.
116. Id. at 156, 288 Minn. at 214.
117. Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 500 N.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (examining constitutionality of section 123.3514 of Minnesota
Statutes (1990)).
118. Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir. 1997).
The federal appeals court found authority for ruling on the state constitutional
claim in Hutchins v. Champion Int’l Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1345 (8th Cir. 1997)
(citing Talley v. U.S. Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1983)). Cf. Minn.
Term Limits Coal. v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306, 307 (Minn. 1995) (federal district
court certified state constitutional question to Minnesota Supreme Court).
119. Stark, 123 F.3d at 1077.
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because no religious instruction took place at the school “and there
is no expenditure of public funds in support of the teaching or
120
promulgating of religious beliefs.”
These cases strongly suggest that courts weighing state
establishment-of-religion claims will strive to not hinder education.
But a fifty-year-old case warns schools not to be lackadaisical. In
Independent School District No. 6 v. Johnson, the Minnesota Supreme
Court found a “probable” violation of the article XIII, section 2
language when the school failed to remove crucifixes, religious
pictures, and holy water fonts from leased school space, but held
that withholding state funding was improper because the State had
121
failed to follow procedures for doing so.
The constitutionality of providing tax credits or deductions for
parents who choose private education for their minor children—to
the indirect benefit of parochial schools—is unresolved under
122
article I, section 16 or article XIII, section 2.
This is not so in
Wisconsin, where the state supreme court examined language
substantially similar to article I, section 16 in upholding a state law
permitting some Milwaukee children to attend any private school at
123
public expense.
In holding that the law did not violate the state
constitutional provision that prohibits public funds from being
used “for the benefit of” religious societies or seminaries, the court
distinguished precedent from 1962 that the state constitution
provided a “stricter standard” than the First Amendment,
determined that “well reasoned” federal cases controlled the state
constitutional inquiry, and concluded that the state law’s “primary
124
effect” was not to advance religion.
The court then used only
state precedent to further conclude that the law did not violate the
state constitutional provision against “compelled” attendance at
120. Id.
121. 65 N.W.2d 668, 669, 673-74, 242 Minn. 539, 540-41, 547-48 (1954).
122. In Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a statute providing tax credits for Minnesota parents who send their
children to “nonpublic schools” violated the Establishment Clause, and further
held that it “need not consider questions raised under the Minnesota
Constitution[.]” 224 N.W.2d 344, 353, 302 Minn. 216, 233 (1974). Then the
United States Supreme Court held in Mueller v. Allen that a Minnesota law
permitting parents to deduct elementary and secondary education expenses,
including those paid to parochial schools, did not offend the Establishment Clause
because the benefit was available to all parents. 463 U.S. 388, 388, 397 (1983).
123. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998).
124. Id. at 620-22 (distinguishing Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1962)).
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125

IV. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
A. Standard Develops in Minnesota Supreme Court
Few tenets are more engrained in the United States than the
idea that persons may exercise their religious beliefs as they wish.
The ethos often is linked to colonists’ desire to escape England’s
126
But as Michael McConnell
“religious strife and intolerance.”
observes, once in America the colonists exercised religiousness in
various ways—with intolerant Puritanism, with a desire to govern by
using religious principles, with “benign neglect” for established
churches and “de facto religious toleration,” and with desire to
127
accommodate religious dissenters.
New York, from which
Minnesota imported its freedom of conscience provision,
subscribed to the “benign neglect” model, “largely due to the
128
extraordinary religious diversity of the area.”
As mentioned previously, strict scrutiny remains the standard
in Minnesota for determining whether a law burdens free exercise
129
of religion. Under article I, section 16, after a person proves that
a sincerely held religious belief is excessively burdened, the state
must prove that the measure is the least restrictive means for
130
serving the overriding or compelling government interest.
The
standard most often is associated with State v. Hershberger, a case in
which Amish buggy drivers sought exemption from a traffic law
131
requiring slow-moving-vehicle signs to be displayed.
However,
ten weeks before Hershberger the Minnesota Supreme Court issued
an often-overlooked plurality decision in State ex rel. Cooper v. French,
which suggests to practitioners that morality sometimes is more
important than precedent when state-constitutional standards are
132
developed.
Two years after Hershberger and Cooper came HillMurray Federation of Teachers v. Hill Murray High School, which
125. Id. at 622-23 (citing Holt v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1975)).
126. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1421.
127. Id. at 1422-24.
128. Id. at 1424; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
130. Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857,
865 (Minn. 1992); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990).
131. 462 N.W.2d at 395.
132. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990).
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solidified the strict scrutiny rule and provided clear guidance on
how to maintain or defend against a free-exercise case under the
133
state constitution.
1.

State ex rel. Cooper v. French

In State ex rel. Cooper v. French, a landlord argued that his
religious rights would be violated if he was forced under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act to rent an apartment to an
134
A fourunmarried woman likely to cohabitate with her fiancé.
justice majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the
landlord, reasoning that the legislature did not intend for the
Human Rights Act to protect “unmarried, cohabitating couples in
housing cases,” particularly amid the state’s “longstanding” distaste
135
for fornication.
Three of the four justices then decided that article I, section
16 “commands this court to weigh the competing interests at stake
136
whenever rights of conscience are burdened” —an inquiry that
Justice John E. Simonett considered unnecessary given the case’s
137
disposition on statutory grounds.
The plurality concluded that
article I, section 16 prevented the marriage-based Human Rights
138
Act provision from being applied to landlord French.
Without
citing supporting authority, the plurality observed that article I,
section 16 “grants far more protection of religious freedom than
139
the broad language of the United States Constitution.”
The
plurality proposed a strict scrutiny test for laws that burden religion
and concluded that the State had failed to prove that ensuring
housing for unmarried women likely to have sex with a significant
133. 487 N.W.2d at 864-67.
134. 460 N.W.2d at 4 (referencing section 363.03, subdivision 2(1)(a) of
Minnesota Statutes (1986)). Landlord French was renting out a two-bedroom
house, which apparently had served as his homestead, until he could sell it. Id. at
3.
135. Id. at 5, 7 (apparently referencing section 609.34 of Minnesota Statutes,
still in effect today, which criminalizes sexual intercourse between “any man” and
a “single woman”). The court observed: “How can there be a compelling state
interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on the books
prohibiting it? . . . Rather than grant French an exemption from the MHRA, the
state would rather grant everyone an exemption from the fornication statute.
Such a result is absurd.” Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 9.
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140

other was a “sufficiently compelling interest.”
Chief Justice Peter S. Popovich dissented, joined by Justices
Rosalie E. Wahl and Alexander M. (Sandy) Keith. Chief Justice
Popovich contended the case was controlled by State ex rel. McClure
v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., where in 1985 the court had applied
both the First Amendment and article I, section 16 to hold that
health-club operators who sought to employ only fundamentalist
141
Christians violated the Human Rights Act.
He argued against
ignoring the First Amendment and observed, “the majority’s
attempt to interpret the Minnesota Constitution’s Freedom of
Conscience provision more broadly is not supported by a single
142
decision of this court.”
2.

State v. Hershberger

Seventy days after deciding French, the court issued its
landmark Hershberger opinion. Again, the case’s evolution provides
valuable insight into how state constitutional cases can develop.
Initially, the court had exempted the Amish buggy drivers from the
state traffic law solely under the First Amendment’s then-valid strict
143
scrutiny test, saving article I, section 16 analysis “for another day.”
Then the United States Supreme Court remanded Hershberger in
light of Employment Division v. Smith, which, as discussed above,
144
largely eviscerated the strict scrutiny standard.
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly observed
that Smith had “significantly changed first amendment free exercise
analysis” and then examined the Amish’s case under article I,
145
section 16.
The court held that the buggy drivers already had
proven that their beliefs were sincere under the recently overruled
146
The question was whether the State had
Sherbert test.
demonstrated “that public safety cannot be achieved through
reasonable alternative means” other than requiring slow-moving140. Id. at 10.
141. Id. at 14-15, 21 (referencing State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club,
Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985)).
142. Id. at 14.
143. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Minn. 1989).
144. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990) (vacating State v.
Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989)); see also supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
145. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-99 (Minn. 1990).
146. Id. at 396; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963)
(requiring plaintiff to prove “substantial” burden).
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vehicle signs.
The court concluded that because lanterns and
reflective tape would adequately protect Amish buggies, the State
had not met its burden under article I, section 16, and for the first
time a majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from
the First Amendment to decide a free exercise claim solely under
148
the Minnesota Constitution.
The author was none other than Chief Justice Popovich, who
just ten weeks earlier had criticized the French plurality for citing no
precedent while ignoring the First Amendment. In Hershberger,
Popovich cited the 1984 article that Judge Nordby co-authored, the
French plurality’s opinion, and Sports & Health Club to hold that
under article I, section 16, the State bears the burden of proving
that it is employing the least restrictive means to fulfill a compelling
149
interest.
3.

Hill-Murray

In Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School
the issue was whether the Minnesota Labor Relations Act could be
applied to a Catholic high school where lay employees sought
150
The court again disavowed the United
union representation.
States Supreme Court’s “limited analysis” on free exercise claims
and declared that Minnesota courts shall “retain the compelling
151
state interest balancing test.” Article I, section 16 was said to have
four prongs: “whether the objector’s belief is sincerely held;
whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious
beliefs; whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or
compelling; and whether the state regulation uses the least
152
restrictive means.”
The court had little trouble finding a sincerely held belief, and
under the third prong found an overriding and compelling state
153
interest in maintaining peace during labor relations. As for the
second prong, the court acknowledged that the school had shown
that the law interfered “with their authority as an employer,” but

147. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 397-99.
150. Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857
(Minn. 1992).
151. Id. at 865.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 865, 867.
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faulted the school for not demonstrating that “this minimal
154
interference excessively burdens their religious beliefs.” Under the
fourth prong, the court held that the school’s proffered voluntary
grievance procedure, while a less-restrictive means, was inadequate
155
because it was “just that—voluntary.”
Therefore, balancing all
four prongs, the court determined that applying the Labor
Relations Act to the Catholic high school did not offend article I,
section 16.
B. Standard Applied in Minnesota Court of Appeals
Because it has confronted all four prongs of the HershbergerHill-Murray test, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has provided
practitioners and district courts with pragmatic, facts-specific
guidance on how state free-exercise claims should be addressed.
Further guidance is likely as Minnesota courts adjudicate whether
the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act—the so-called
“conceal and carry” law that prevents employers, including
churches, from banning firearms from their parking lots—is
156
constitutional.
As for when a religious belief is sincere, the court of appeals
held that conditioning an unapologetic sex offender’s probation
on him admitting the crime does not violate article I, section 16
because telling the truth is “more of a pragmatic, cost-benefit
157
principle than anything else.”
The court has also held that
prohibiting medicinal use of marijuana infringes a “personal”
medical need and not a sincerely held religious belief, even though

154. Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 867.
156. See Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 597, 600 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that the act violated the “single-subject requirement” of
article IV, section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution, but declining to review the
article I, section 16 claim “on an advisory basis”). The district court had addressed
the case’s merits, ruling that the plaintiff churches that seek to exclude firearms
from their parking lots had met their burden under article I, section 16, and that
the State had failed to identify a compelling interest or to address less-restrictive
alternatives. Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, No. C9-03-9570, 2004 WL 1630505,
at *9-11 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. July 14, 2004). A similar action is pending in
Hennepin County District Court. See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 673
N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, No.
MC 03-008185, 2004 WL 632766 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. March 16, 2004); see
also Margaret Zack, Lawsuit Over Conceal-Carry Takes on Guns at Church, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Aug. 2, 2005, at 1B.
157. State v. Schwartz, 598 N.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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the Book of Genesis directs that “God gives us every plant bearing
158
seeds inside itself for our consumption and for our health.”
Forbidding a criminal defendant from wearing a cross during trial
might impinge a sincerely held religious belief, but failing to hold a
hearing on the issue does not create an error necessitating a new
159
trial.
Twice the court of appeals has held that the Christ’s
Household of Faith church requirement that members work full
160
time for the church is a sincerely held religious belief. Requiring
a restaurateur to deliver food inside a facility where abortions are
performed infringes on the “moral conscience” and therefore
161
impinges on a sincerely held religious belief.
Mandatory
standardized school testing was held to infringe on sincerely held
religious views of parents who believe that sending their children to
public schools would risk the parents’ “eternal damnation” and
sending them to parochial schools would interfere with a “personal
162
relationship” with God.
As for when beliefs are burdened, the Christ’s Household of
Faith cases suggest that an individual’s right to believe is superior to
a church’s right to maintain an autonomous forum for those
beliefs. Both cases involved fathers ordered to pay child support—
one through a court order that named the father, the other
through mandatory withholding from the Christ’s Household of
163
Faith church, which was the father’s employer.
In the first case,
the court held that the father’s beliefs were burdened by forcing him
to take a job outside the church to pay a child-support obligation,
but in the second case the court held that requiring the church to
withhold child support from the father’s earnings was permissible
because it was indistinguishable from requiring the church to issue
tax forms and did not force the church to “change its religious
164
conduct or philosophy.”
As for the third prong, the court of appeals has held that
158. State v. Pedersen, 679 N.W.2d 368, 371-72, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Genesis 1:11-12, 29; 9:3).
159. State v. Tate, 682 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
160. Rooney v. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d 362, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Murphy v.
Murphy, 574 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that appellant had
been a church member for two decades, had married in the church, and worked
forty hours a week for the church).
161. Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
162. In re Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d 88, 90, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
163. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 369; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81.
164. Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 369-70; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81.
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165

education and ensuring parental child support were compelling
166
government interests, but that enforcing a civil rights ordinance
167
against an anti-abortion restaurateur was not.
On the fourth prong—when burdening sincerely held
religious beliefs is found to be the least restrictive way to satisfy the
government interest—the court of appeals encourages government
to at least try some other step before undertaking the potentially
infringing activity.
In Rooney v. Rooney, the child-support
withholding case, the court noted that the county’s other efforts,
including revoking the father’s driver’s license and garnishing
168
wages of other employers, had failed.
However, in Murphy v.
Murphy, the other child-support case, the court held that it could
not determine whether the least-restrictive means were used
because the record lacked information on how much work the
father could do outside the church without infringing on his
169
religious obligations.
Likewise, in the standardized testing case,
the court of appeals criticized the district court for removing
children from the home before exhausting “additional statutory
170
remedies . . . .”
C. The Standard Summarized
The Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases
suggest that when assessing a law under article I, section 16’s fourprong inquiry, a Minnesota court will perform a fact-intensive
balancing test and will not rigidly apply standards as to burdens of
production and proof. Individuals such as the anti-abortion
restaurateur and distinct minority groups such as the Amish seem
to be held to something less than the “excessive” burden to beliefs
that Hill-Murray High School had to prove. Courts appear less
likely to compel behavior (i.e., displaying a slow-moving vehicle sign,
renting an apartment, delivering food, testing children) than to
prevent behavior (i.e., using marijuana, displaying a cross during
trial). In addition, when a generally applicable law is at issue,
individual plaintiffs such as small-business people or fathers curry
courts’ favor better than groups such as Catholic high schools.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d at 92.
Rooney, 669 N.W.2d at 370; Murphy, 574 N.W.2d at 81-82.
Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
669 N.W.2d at 370-71.
574 N.W.2d at 82.
In re Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d at 93.
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And, for good or for bad, it appears that free exercise claims
arising under article I, section 16 remain fact-specific and
171
susceptible to moral judgments:
marijuana, sex before marriage,
and abortion are bad; the Amish way of life is admirable; and
children and labor relations are more important than “minimal
interference” with church doctrine.
D. Jurisdiction and Standing
Minnesota’s appellate courts employ article I, section 16 apart
from the substantive free-exercise context to determine whether a
court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate civil actions
against churches. Burdens of proof yield to an appellate court’s de
novo review, consistent with the general rule that subject matter
jurisdiction may be challenged at any time and even on the
172
Accordingly, when a church or
appellate court’s own motion.
church official is a party in a Minnesota state court, litigants should
be poised to adjudicate procedural questions involving jurisdiction
and standing under article I, section 16.
The leading case is Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, decided in 2002, where a minister, sued after having
romantic relations with a parishioner-counselee, contended that
enforcing a negligence claim would violate his state constitutional
173
rights.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a
statute regulating unlicensed mental health professionals merely
provided a “floor of acceptable conduct” that fails to burden
religious practice, that the State’s interest in protecting against the
“frequently vulnerable nature” of counselees was compelling, and
171. As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed in French:
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western
civilizations for eons. This generation does not have a monopoly on
either knowledge or wisdom. Before abandoning fundamental values
and institutions, we must pause and take stock of our present social
order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising underclass
without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets; children with
only one parent or no parent at all; and children with no one to guide
them in developing any set of values. How can we expect anything else
when the state contributes, by arguments of this kind, to further erosion
of fundamental institutions that have formed the foundation of our
civilizations for centuries?
State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (Minn. 1990).
172. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
173. 649 N.W.2d 426, 443 (Minn. 2002).
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that the statute did not regulate any “spiritual advice or guidance”
174
In a
and therefore was “tailored in a non-restrictive manner.”
similar case in 2003, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
article I, section 16 did not deprive a court of subject-matter
jurisdiction to determine whether an employment relationship
175
existed between a pastor and his church’s governing body.
Three other court of appeals cases from 1995 remain relevant.
In Lundman v. McKown, which involved the death of a child treated
by Christian Science practitioners, the court held that awarding
compensatory damages did not violate article I, section 16 because
the damages were not a “vehicle for attacking religious belief” and
were more effective at furthering the state’s compelling interest in
protecting children than measures such as criminally prosecuting
176
Christian Scientist custodial parents. But jurisdiction was denied
under article I, section 16 in the other 1995 cases. In Geraci v.
Eckankar, the court held that adjudicating an employmenttermination claim from an Eckankar church employee who became
ineligible for church membership “would require a court to
question Eckankar’s monitoring of Geraci’s adherence to church
doctrine, its reasons for excommunication, and the veracity of
177
Eckankar’s responses.”
In Basich v. Board of Pensions, Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America, the court denied jurisdiction in a
breach-of-contract claim from pastors who challenged a pension
plan’s divestment from companies doing business in South Africa,
174. Id. at 442-43. Subsequently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the
Minnesota Constitution did not bar jurisdiction against the Minnesota Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists for negligent employment and vicarious liability.
Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569, 576
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
175. Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 262 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003). The court also affirmed jurisdiction for a vicarious liability claim because
there was no showing of “how an examination by the court of whether sexual
penetration occurred within the scope of employment involves any inquiry into
church doctrine or procedure . . . .” Id. at 264.
176. 530 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 31,
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996).
177. 526 N.W.2d 391, 395, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Mar.
14, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995). But in 1991, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that subjecting a Lutheran church to a terminated pastor’s sexual
harassment claim under the Human Rights Act presented no burden to church
practices “in light of the church’s own policy against such conduct.” Black v.
Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). “Even if this regulation
would incidentally burden religious activity or belief, [the pastor] is entitled to
assert this claim because the state’s interest in eradicating sexual harassment in the
work place is compelling . . . .” Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/2

32

Aggergaard: Religion, Speech, and the Minnesota Constitution: State-based Pro
08AGGERGAARD.DOC

1/14/2006 5:55:11 PM

2006] RELIGION, SPEECH, AND THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION 751

finding an article I, section 16 violation because the lawsuit
involved “social or moral investment strategies” and because there
178
was no compelling interest in solving the dispute.
Recently, the court of appeals employed article I, section 16 to
examine a plaintiff church’s standing to sue over Minnesota’s
179
“conceal and carry” law.
In affirming standing, the court
preliminarily reviewed the claim’s merits, concluding that “[i]t
would be disingenuous for us to deny the existence of a justiciable
controversy where appellants have raised an arguably viable
180
challenge to free exercise.”
These cases signal that article I, section 16 permits Minnesota
courts to adjudicate disputes involving churches as long as neutral
legal principles may be applied without judicial intrusion into
181
church doctrine.
Burden of proof appears to be a non-issue:
Courts are to weigh all relevant factors at any stage of the litigation
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction or standing are
present. In addition, once a compelling governmental interest is
found, it seems that something other than strict scrutiny is applied
for determining whether judicial enforcement is the least-restrictive
182
option.
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. A Speech-Hostile Minnesota
During times of peace and even of war, “Americans
183
consistently have testified to the underlying value of free speech.”
Minnesotans, for their part, frequently position themselves “in the

178. 540 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 25,
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996).
179. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 673 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004).
180. Id. at 523.
181. See also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25
(1976) (holding that “hierarchical religious organizations” may establish rules and
tribunals for “internal discipline and government” to which civil courts must defer
under the First Amendment).
182. In Odenthal, for instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
statute regulating unlicensed counselors was “tailored in a non-restrictive
manner”—hardly language confirming that the least-restrictive means was
employed. Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d
426, 443 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis added).
183. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 13 (1997).
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184

forefront for protection of public debate.”
For example, after
more than 400 St. Paul Pioneer Press readers responded to an
informal survey about free speech in 2005, the opinion page editor
wrote a column headlined First Amendment Alive, Well Here to
distinguish Minnesota as being outside a national trend of hostility
185
toward free speech.
Article I, section 3 of the Minnesota
Constitution, which affirms that “all persons may freely speak, write
and publish their sentiments on all subjects” and declares that the
press “shall forever remain inviolate,” seems to confirm
186
Minnesota’s prominence as a place of speech tolerance.
However, article I, section 3 also specifies that speakers are
“responsible for the abuse” from exercising their rights, and
Minnesota historically has led the nation not just in punishing
187
speech but in restraining it under state law.
In 1907, the
Minnesota Supreme Court cited article I, section 3 while holding
that the Pioneer Press could be convicted for violating a state law
barring newspapers from publishing specific details of executions—
details, according to the court, that were likely to have “an
188
unwholesome effect on the public mind.”
Eight years later, the
court did not even mention article I, section 3 when affirming the
189
Minneapolis mayor’s discretion to revoke a movie-theater license.
Professor William Anderson, in his 1921 treatise A History of the
Constitution of Minnesota, observed that it was appropriate to control
and punish speech when government faced “certain emergencies”
190
such as war.
In his 1941 treatise Free Speech in the United States,
Zechariah Chafee Jr. observed that no state eclipsed Minnesota’s
use of state law to punish antiwar speech during and after World
War I even though “not a single person was dissuaded from
191
enlisting.”
184. Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991).
185. Art Coulson, First Amendment Alive, Well Here, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb.
13, 2005, at 10B.
186. MINN. CONST. art. I. § 3.
187. Id.
188. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 110 N.W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 175 (1907).
189. Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964, 965-66, 195 Minn. 195,
198-99 (1915).
190. ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 159.
191. ZECHARAIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 100-01, 287-88
(1941). Chafee observed that the Minnesota Reports contain eighteen World War
I criminal prosecutions of persons charged with making speech that had a “natural
and reasonable effect” of urging against military service, even though “not a single
person was dissuaded from enlisting, and even though the jury found and believed
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Minnesota cases prompted the United States Supreme Court
to extend the First Amendment’s speech clause to the states. In
Gilbert v. Minnesota, in which the Court affirmed a World War I
pacifist’s conviction under Minnesota law for making speech with a
“natural and reasonable effect” to dissuade military enlistment,
Justice Louis Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, became first on
the Court to write that the First Amendment applied to the states
192
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Eleven years later came
Near v. Minnesota, where the Supreme Court derailed Minnesota’s
effort to “wage war on the yellow press” and, in so doing, for the
193
first time invalidated a state law under the First Amendment.
that the speaker had not the slightest intention of hindering enlistment or any
other war service.” Id. at 287-88.
One would have supposed that the federal Espionage Act was a sufficient
safeguard against opposition to the war, but many states were not
satisfied with either its terms or its enforcement, and enacted similar but
more drastic laws of their own . . . . The most important of these statutes,
that of Minnesota, made it unlawful to say “that men should not enlist in
the military or naval forces of the United States or the State of
Minnesota,” or that residents of that state should not aid the United
States in carrying on war with the public enemies.
Id. at 100-01. Chafee concluded that Minnesota was ripe for antiwar speech
because of the “large number of farmers of German birth,” and the general rural
agrarian antagonism toward urban interests that stood to benefit from World War
I. Id. at 288.
192. State v. Gilbert, 169 N.W. 790, 791, 141 Minn. 263, 265 (1918), aff’d sub
nom. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). In dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote:
As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it interferes
with federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the United States
to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether it violates also the
Fourteenth Amendment. But I have difficulty in believing that the liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution, which has been held to protect against
state denial the right of an employer to discriminate against a workman
because he is a member of a trade union, the right of a business man to
conduct a private employment agency, or to contract outside the state for
insurance of his property, although the Legislature deems it inimical to
the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy
of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as
Congress has not declared that the public safety demands its suppression.
I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted). Brandeis’s dissent “was the first glimmer of the new day which was to
dawn” five years later as the First Amendment speech clause was extended to the
states. CHAFEE, supra note 191, at 297.
193. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931). Six years
earlier, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), the Court had upheld New
York state’s “criminal anarchy” statute and observed that “[f]or present purposes
we may and do assume” that the First Amendment applied to the states. But
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In both Gilbert and Near, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
194
The
held that article I, section 3 did not protect the speech.
court observed that the pacifist’s words ran counter to “our
purpose in the war” and the idea “that the world must be made safe
195
for democracy,” and that article I, section 3 was reserved only for
newspapers that “publish the truth with impunity, with good
196
motives, and for justifiable ends.”
As the court said in State v.
Guilford, the precursor to Near:
[O]ur Constitution was never intended to protect malice,
scandal and defamation when untrue or published with
bad motive or without justifiable ends. It is a shield for
the honest, careful and conscientious press. Liberty of the
press does not mean that an evilminded person may
publish just anything any more than the constitutional
right of free assembly authorizes and legalizes unlawful
assemblies and riots. . . . [T]he Legislature is authorized
to make laws to bridle the appetites of those who thrive
197
upon scandal and rejoice in its consequences.
Article I, section 3 must be examined against this backdrop—
in which the Minnesota Constitution was used not just to punish
speech but also to restrict it before it could be punished. This
perspective helps gauge how Minnesota courts have resolved state
constitutional cases involving speech.
B. Protest Speech and Framework for Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent application of
198
article I, section 3 is in State v. Wicklund, the Mall of America
199
The holding is that when protesters’ speech
protest case.

because the speaker lost, the sentence sometimes is considered dictum such that
Near may be credited with incorporating the First Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Nadine Strossen, Frontiers of Legal Thought II, The New
First Amendment: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 484, 565 n.411 (1990) (characterizing Gitlow’s incorporation language as
dictum).
194. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 772, 174 Minn. 457, 463;
State v. Gilbert, 169 N.W. at 792, 141 Minn. at 267.
195. Gilbert, 169 N.W. at 791, 141 Minn. at 265.
196. Guilford, 219 N.W. at 771-72, 174 Minn. at 459, 462.
197. Id. at 772, 174 Minn. at 463. There is no Minnesota constitutional right to
free assembly. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
198. 589 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Minn. 1999).
199. Id.; see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding no First
Amendment right to enter a shopping center to advertise a strike).
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interests are balanced against private property interests under the
state constitution, the property owners win, particularly when the
200
speakers’ goal is provocation and not furthering a political end:
Appellants’ speech was directed at persuading shoppers to
forgo buying fur products and to boycott Macy’s in an
attempt to effect change in the retail and fur industries.
Its purpose was not to achieve some political goal such as
a ballot initiative—it is best characterized as protest
speech, intended to be provocative. We decline to extend
the free speech protections of Article I, Section 3 of the
Minnesota Constitution beyond those protections offered
201
by the First Amendment.
202
This primacy of property rights is bolstered by State v. Olson,
where in 1970 the court invoked article I, section 3 as well as the
First Amendment to uphold the disturbing-the-peace conviction of
a protester who intended to “create a dialogue” at a Minneapolis
Catholic church during Mass by accusing the priest of “hypocrisy”
203
in a “loud and angry tone.”
Neither the state nor federal
constitution, according to the court, prohibited criminal sanctions
204
to curb “insulting remarks and bizarre behavior.”
Besides providing a relevant balancing test, Wicklund also
suggests to practitioners a framework, open to criticism, that the
Minnesota Supreme Court might follow when examining speech
205
claims under the state constitution. As mentioned previously, the
court identified its “first consideration” not as what the plain
language of article I, section 3 said, but as what the Minnesota
Constitution’s framers intended by drafting the provision more
206
broadly than the First Amendment. Finding no intent to depart,
the “next question” for the court was whether there was “sound
207
reason” for departing from the federal standard.
The court
found no reason to depart, distinguishing decisions in which the
court had extended state constitutional rights to privacy and to
counsel, as well as article I, section 3 cases involving commercial

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 798-99, 801.
Id. at 801.
178 N.W.2d 230, 231, 287 Minn. 300, 301 (1970).
Id.
Id. at 232, 287 Minn. at 304.
589 N.W.2d at 794-95.
Id. at 798-99; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 799.
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208

speech, obscenity, and freedom of the press.
Next, after observing that most states apply their speech
provisions no differently than the First Amendment, the court
confronted speech in shopping malls and observed that a “small
minority” of states afford stronger protections under state
constitutions but typically “under the cloak of another
209
constitutional provision” related to the political process.
Given
that the Mall of America protesters intended to provoke instead of
politick, the court denied them access to the mall under the
210
Minnesota Constitution.
The court was correct that courts commonly do not affirm
independent state constitutional protections for speech, including
211
in shopping malls, and the court is not alone in ignoring the
212
But by distinguishing the fur
constitution’s plain language.
protesters from those who might further a “political goal such as a
213
ballot initiative,” one wonders whether the court might deviate
from its Wicklund analysis by examining article I, section 3’s plain
language and, under certain circumstances, side with persons
214
seeking mall access for purely political purposes.
Besides, few
places other than Minnesota may boast of a public-private place
215
quite like the Mall of America.
Although Minnesota’s World War I protest cases could have
been dismissed as irrelevant just a few years ago, recent campaigns
against global terrorism suggest that the cases should not be
discarded. Among the earliest and most illustrative is State v.
216
where the Minnesota Supreme Court punished
Holm,
pamphleteers who characterized the war as “arbitrarily declared
208. Id. at 799-800.
209. Id. at 800-01 (citing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 592 P.2d 341
(Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445
N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B.
Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Whifen, 849 P.2d 446
(Or. 1993)).
210. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801.
211. See, e.g., City of W. Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa
2002); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 843-44 (Wis. 1987).
212. See, e.g., supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
213. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 801.
214. See Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 849 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (observing that shopping-mall management “exercises an
enormous power when it denies political speakers access to such a center of
community life”).
215. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
216. 166 N.W. 181, 181, 139 Minn. 267, 271 (1918).
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against the will of the people,” claimed that “the President and
Congress have forced this war upon the United States[,]” and
concluded that “the integrity of the country is being menaced” in
217
favor of Wall Street interests.
The defendants’ punishment
appeared based both on article I, section 3 and the First
Amendment, and the rationale was affirmed in several more
218
cases. Eventually, laws such as Minnesota’s that punished speech
219
based on bad tendencies or “natural” effects were struck down.
The future of punishing and preventing war-protest speech
under state and federal constitutions is not clear given the nation’s
ongoing response to the 2001 terrorist attacks. As Professor David
M. Rabban wrote in 1997, “when politics does not go well, and
produces a Red Scare or a McCarthy Era or some other state
enforcement of ‘political correctness,’ the right to free speech may
220
serve important purposes for society as well as individuals.”
But
as First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh observed in 2005,
“making fear of terrorism an ‘underlying theme of domestic and
foreign policy’ is quite proper when terrorists are doing frightening
221
things.”
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also State v. Randall, 173 N.W. 425, 143 Minn. 203 (1919); State v.
Gilbert, 169 N.W. 790, 141 Minn. 263 (1918); State v. Kaercher, 169 N.W. 699, 141
Minn. 186 (1918); but see State v. Townley, 168 N.W. 591, 594, 140 Minn. 413, 423
(1918) (holding that speech did not violate the statute because it was “nothing
more serious than a rhetorical, and somewhat flamboyant, platform”).
219. A year after Holm, in 1919, the United States Supreme Court held in
Schenck v. United States that speech that presents a “clear and present danger” to
wartime interests may be restrained by the federal Espionage Act. 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919). Six years later, in Gitlow v. New York, the Court upheld New York state’s
“criminal anarchy” statute that criminalized speech that “advocates, advises or
teaches” overthrow of the government. 268 U.S. 625, 626 (1925). Arguably, this
decision invalidated broad laws such as Minnesota’s that examined speech for bad
tendencies or “natural” effects. The “clear and present danger” test resurfaced
after the United States entered World War II when the Smith Act criminalized
speech (by Communists) that advocated the government’s overthrow. Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The final Smith Act conviction was affirmed in
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Deference to the government’s
determination of what constitutes danger eroded during the Vietnam War,
evidenced by the Court’s refusal in the “Pentagon Papers” case to bar newspapers
from publishing classified war details. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
220. RABBAN, supra note 183, at 393. However, “[s]ubstantial doubts can more
generally be raised as to whether any constitutional standard, however protective
its language, can safeguard free speech in times of crisis.” Id. at 379.
221. Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is It
Proper, 93 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); see also Carpenter, supra note 38, at
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C. Prior Restraint
When government prohibits speech, it commits prior
restraint—“the most serious and the least tolerable infringement
222
on First Amendment rights.”
Given the interstate and
international natures of communication, it seems imprudent to
decide prior restraint cases solely under state constitutional law.
Nevertheless, cases decided under article I, section 3 reveal a
sobering willingness among the Minnesota judiciary to restrain the
news media from disseminating information simply because
legislators considered it injurious.
223
In State v. Pioneer Press Co., the ninety-eight-year-old case
upholding a state statute forbidding newspapers from detailing
public executions, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged
that article I, section 3 was “directly aimed at the removal of
previous restraints upon public speech and freedom of the press,”
but that “it does not follow that there is a constitutional right to
224
publish every fact or statement which may be true.”
The court
deemed it permissible to report an execution’s occurrence but
impermissible to describe the prisoner’s transport to the scaffold,
his last statement, his noose and “black cap,” and, after the
225
“springing of the trap,” the body’s removal.
The supreme court
gave remarkable deference to the legislature’s effort to “surround
the execution of criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in
order to avoid exciting an unwholesome effect on the public
226
mind.”
Pioneer Press was cited for support twenty-one years later in State
227
228
Hennepin
v. Guilford, the case that became Near v. Minnesota.
County prosecutor (and eventual governor) Floyd B. Olson wielded
the Public Nuisance Law of 1925 to “wage war on the yellow press”
625. “In an emergency, where there will be no time or opportunity for counterspeech to prevent some evil, the [speech-protective] antipaternalism principle will
not stand in the way of government speech restrictions designed to avoid it.” Id.
222. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
223. 110 N.W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 176 (1907).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 867, 100 Minn. at 174.
226. Id. at 868, 100 Minn. at 175. “[I]f, in the opinion of the Legislature, it is
detrimental to public morals to publish anything more than the mere fact that the
execution has taken place, then, under the authorities and upon principle, the
appellant was not deprived of any constitutional right in being so limited.” Id. at
868-69, 100 Minn. at 177.
227. 219 N.W. 770, 772, 174 Minn. 457, 461 (1928).
228. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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by enjoining publishers who “customarily” produce, publish,
circulate, possess, or give away a newspaper deemed “malicious,
229
scandalous and defamatory . . . .”
Olson’s specific targets were
Howard A. Guilford and Jay M. Near who, among other things,
reported “links between gambling syndicates and the police,” and
printed accusations of election fraud in their “sensational” weekly
230
newspaper, the Saturday Press.
A district judge enjoined the
publishers and certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the
question of the Public Nuisance Law’s constitutionality in light of
article I, section 3’s directive that press liberty “shall forever remain
231
Accordingly, the supreme court held that article I,
inviolate.”
section 3 protected only those who publish “with good motives, and
232
for justifiable ends . . . .”
Between Pioneer Press and Guilford came Campbell v. Motion
Picture Machine Operators’ Union of Minneapolis, where the Minnesota
Supreme Court applied antitrust law to enjoin the weekly
Minneapolis Labor Review, a union mouthpiece, from publishing
statements claiming that a theater owner was unfair to organized
233
labor. The court rejected the newspaper’s argument that the free
speech right in “the Constitution”—presumably Minnesota’s—was
infringed, explaining that the newspaper went beyond merely
234
notifying the public of a controversy.
The court likened the
newspaper’s pro-union campaign to an intentional tort against
property: “The right of free speech is abused when words become
verbal acts, and are then as much subject to injunction as the use of
235
any other force whereby property is wrongfully injured.”

229. State v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 771, 174 Minn. 457, 458 (1928); FRED W.
FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: CORRUPTION, YELLOW JOURNALISM, AND THE CASE THAT
SAVED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 21, 50 (Univ. of Minn. 2003) (1981).
230. FRIENDLY, supra note 229, at 39.
231. Id. at 53.
232. Guilford, 219 N.W. at 772, 174 Minn. at 462. A year later, Guilford and
Near argued to the Minnesota Supreme Court that they were prevented from
publishing “any kind of newspaper,” in violation of article I, section 3 and state
and federal due process rights. State v. Guilford, 228 N.W. 326, 326, 179 Minn. 40,
41 (1929). The court dismissed the claims, observing that the publishers still
could operate a newspaper “in harmony with the public welfare.” Id.
233. Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators’ Union of Minneapolis, 186
N.W. 781, 781-82, 151 Minn. 220, 224, 226 (1922).
234. Id. at 785, 151 Minn. at 232.
235. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
08AGGERGAARD.DOC

760

1/14/2006 5:55:11 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

D. Newsgathering
Apart from the right to publish news is the right (or lack of a
right) to gather news. Given the cross-jurisdictional nature of
newsgathering today, using state constitutions to ensure journalists’
rights might be imprudent. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has considered newsgathering cases in light of article I,
236
section 3.
Journalists are subject to generally applicable laws. The
United States Supreme Court made this point clearly in Cohen v.
237
Cowles Media Co., another case originating in Minnesota with
eventual article I, section 3 undertones. The Court held that the
First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the
two Twin Cities daily newspapers that dishonored promises not to
238
publish a confidential source’s name.
In his majority opinion,
Justice Byron R. White urged the Minnesota Supreme Court on
239
remand to consider whether article I, section 3 barred such a suit.
In response, the state supreme court acknowledged that it “may, of
course, construe our free speech provision to afford broader
protection than the federal clause,” but bowed to the First
Amendment because the “full First Amendment implications” of
240
reporter-source agreements remained unclear.
Four years later, in State v. Turner, the court again examined

236. See State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Minn. 1996); Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992); Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1977).
237. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
238. Id. at 669-70. Star Tribune (Minneapolis) and Pioneer Press (St. Paul)
reporters had agreed not to publish the name of a political source who provided
damaging information about a rival candidate for Minnesota governor. Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990). Editors overruled the
reporters after deciding that the attempted “smear” campaign was newsworthy. Id.
at 201. The source, Dan Cohen, sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and
breach of contract. Id. at 202. The applicability of promissory estoppel surfaced
only during oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that
applying promissory estoppel law would violate the First Amendment because it
would chill political speech at the First Amendment’s core. Id. at 204 n.5, 205.
Cohen had no cause of action for defamation because the newspapers’ reports
were true. Id. at 202.
239. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672. “The [Minnesota Supreme Court] opinion did
not refer to freedom of the press under the Minnesota Constitution. Perhaps
defendants’ counsel, like New York’s media lawyers, believed only in the First
Amendment.” Linde, supra note 57, at 219.
240. Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391.
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article I, section 3 protections for newsgatherers.
At issue was
whether a Pioneer Press photographer could resist a criminal
defendant’s subpoena seeking the photographer’s testimony and
unpublished photographs related to the defendant’s arrest, which
the photographer had chronicled while riding with St. Paul police
242
officers.
In interpreting article I, section 3, the Minnesota
Supreme Court again followed federal precedent to hold that it did
“not see how requiring a news photographer to testify regarding
events he personally witnessed during the pursuit and arrest of an
alleged drug offender will infringe upon our state constitution’s
243
guarantee of free speech and publication.”
The court has signaled that there might be a state
constitutional right to gather news from criminal-case files. In
Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, the court noted the relevance
of article I, section 3 as well as the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution to direct that
newspapers were to receive access to court files from two high244
profile homicides.
The court held that although court files may
be restricted in a “rare or extraordinary case,” the petitioner
seeking closure has the burden of establishing a “strong factual
basis,” and the district court must make specific findings after
245
considering “all alternatives to the exceptional remedy . . . .”
E. Adult Speech
In State v. Davidson, a 1992 case in which the manager of an
adult bookstore challenged his obscenity conviction under the state
constitution, the Minnesota Supreme Court again found “no
reason to apply our constitution differently” than the First
Amendment and without dissent affirmed the conviction under

241. 550 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1996).
242. Id. at 624-25.
243. Id. at 628-29. But the court did order in camera review of the unpublished
photographs to balance “the defendant’s need for evidence” against
“overburdening the news media.” Id. at 629.
244. 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1977). The court files referred to the August 1977
shooting death of Shirleen Howard in Winona and the arrest of her husband and
the June 1977 death of Elizabeth Congdon and her nurse, Velma Pietila, in
Duluth, and the arrest of Congdon’s son-in-law. Id. at 255-56.
245. Id. at 257. The court characterized the case as one of “prior restraint,”
but the opinion does not suggest that the newspapers were barred from publishing
information that they possessed. Id. Accordingly, the case is better characterized
as one involving newsgathering.
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246

article I, section 3.
Essentially, the court held that although the
state constitution ensures that persons may speak on all subjects,
the fact that speakers may be “responsible for the abuse”—
including for peddling obscenity, which the court noted is
247
unprotected by the First Amendment—is paramount.
Today, state constitutions may be of limited use in obscenity
cases now that pornography typically is found not in local
bookstores but on the global internet. But for purely local “adult
speech” such as nude dancing, article I, section 3 remains relevant
and, judging by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most-recent case
248
on the subject, is ripe for reconsideration.
Knudtson v. City of Coates involved a municipality’s power to ban
249
nude dancing in establishments with liquor licenses. Writing for
a four justice-majority, Justice Simonett characterized nude
dancing as “expressive conduct” and “hybrid speech” under article
I, section 3, but largely echoed the United States Supreme Court in
observing that an ordinance banning nude dancing “can be viewed
as a reasonable exercise of the municipality’s police powers” and
that any “curtailment of free expression is nominal and incidental
and insufficient to cancel the public welfare concerns of the
250
community.”
Chief Justice Keith purported to join the court’s
opinion, but in a special concurrence doubted whether article I,
251
section 3 protected nude dancing in public places, and in so
doing, arguably deprived Knudtson of precedential force.
A dissent by Justice Sandra S. Gardebring, joined by Justices

246. 481 N.W.2d 51, 55, 57 (Minn. 1992). The anti-obscenity statute, section
617.241 of Minnesota Statutes, mirrors the First Amendment definition of
obscenity: “the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex and
depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner sexual contact . . . which, taken
as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
MINN. STAT. 617.241, subd. 1(a) (2004); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (defining obscenity).
247. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d at 56, 57; see also Mark D. Salsbury, Note,
Questions of Vagueness and State Constitutional Legitimacy: The State Constitutional
Challenge to Minnesota’s Obscenity Statute: State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51 (Minn.
1992), 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 318 (1992) (criticizing Davidson as “expos[ing]
Minnesota Constitutional analysis to attack as being arbitrary and selective”).
248. See Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994).
249. Id. at 167.
250. Id. at 169; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566, 568
(1991) (characterizing nudity as “expressive conduct” on the “outer perimeters of
the First Amendment,” which may be regulated to further “societal order and
morality”).
251. Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 170 (Keith, C.J., concurring).
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Esther M. Tomljanovich and Alan C. Page, called the majority’s
opinion a “staggering departure from our history of providing
significant protection of individual rights under the state
252
constitution.”
Justice Gardebring characterized the holding as
“frightening” and feared it would “make the Minnesota
Constitution largely irrelevant to the ongoing debate on the
parameters of free speech in this country”:
The rule of law announced today may not appear
dangerous to a free society when applied to nude dancing,
but it is no less available in the constitutional analysis of
other types of speech. The majority, with scant analysis,
has abandoned a worthy history of providing significant
protection for individual rights under the state’s
constitution and approved an unprecedented and
253
frightening approach to free speech analysis.
Given this discord, the fact that only Justice Page (a Knudtson
dissenter) remains on the court, the shifts in the United States
Supreme Court’s First Amendment analyses, the localized nature of
nude dancing, and the general willingness of nude-dancing
establishments to pay for litigation, it seems likely, if not necessary,
that these state constitutional standards will be reconsidered.
Minnesota courts might find guidance in Oregon, where in
2005 the state supreme court referenced the state constitution’s
“sweeping” right to free expression and employed established state
constitutional precedent to invalidate a state law and local
254
The
ordinance restricting sexually oriented public nudity.
Oregon court acknowledged that even unpopular expression must
be protected under the state constitution: “[T]he words are so clear
and sweeping that we think we would not be keeping faith with the
framers who wrote them if we were to qualify or water them down,
unless the historical record demonstrated clearly that the framers
255
meant something other than what they said.”
252. Id. at 170 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 172.
254. State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 629 (Or. 2005); City of Nyssa v.
Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639, 642 (Or. 2005). The Oregon Constitution provides that
“[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person
shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” OR. CONST. art I. § 8.
255. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d at 629. “[I]t appears to us to be beyond reasonable
dispute that the protection extends to the kinds of expression that a majority of
citizens in many communities would dislike—profanity, blasphemy,
pornography—and even to physical acts, such as nude dancing or other explicit
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Commercial Speech

Commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection
than social, political, or religious speech, and under the United
States Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test may be regulated if it is
unlawful and misleading and if regulation would further a
256
Given the multi-jurisdictional
substantial governmental interest.
nature of commerce, relying solely on the state constitution to
resolve commercial speech cases seems imprudent. Nevertheless,
in 1992 the Minnesota Supreme Court examined article I, section 3
twice in the commercial speech context and incorporated Central
257
Hudson into the state constitutional analysis.
In Minnesota League of Credit Unions v. Minnesota Department of
Commerce, the court again signaled that article I, section 3 may
provide greater protection than the First Amendment, but
concluded that Central Hudson adequately protected the parties’
258
rights.
Less than five months later, in State v. Casino Marketing
Group, Inc., the chance that article I, section 3 would be interpreted
independent from the First Amendment for commercial speech
dissipated when the supreme court proclaimed its “general accord”
with Central Hudson and found “no reason” to interpret the state
259
constitution differently. But the Oregon Supreme Court deviated
sexual conduct, that have an expressive component.” Id.
256. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the
United States Supreme Court set a four-part test for determining whether
government may regulate or otherwise restrict commercial speech: (1) the lawful
or misleading nature of the speech, (2) the government interest’s substantiality,
(3) whether the regulation directly advances the government’s interest, and (4)
whether the regulation “is not more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.” 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (characterizing Central Hudson as “an adequate basis for
decision” and clarifying that the standard of the fourth prong of the test is not the
“least restrictive means” but a narrowly tailored “reasonable fit” between the ends
and the means). The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined commercial speech
as “expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its
audience” that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction, such as
price advertising.” State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Minn.
1981) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
257. See Minn. League of Credit Unions v. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, 486
N.W.2d 399, 403-04 (Minn. 1992); State v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d
882, 883-84, 885 n.2, 892 (Minn. 1992).
258. 486 N.W.2d at 403-04. The case involved a rule allowing the state to
secure a statement from credit unions agreeing to nonsolicitation of certain
members. Id. at 401.
259. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d at 883-84, 885 n.2, 892. At issue was a law

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/2

46

Aggergaard: Religion, Speech, and the Minnesota Constitution: State-based Pro
08AGGERGAARD.DOC

1/14/2006 5:55:11 PM

2006] RELIGION, SPEECH, AND THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION 765

from Central Hudson in a telemarketer-regulation case factually
similar to Casino Marketing Group and invalidated a state law solely
260
on state constitutional grounds.
G. Gaps in Coverage
A few words are necessary on areas parallel to the First
Amendment where the Minnesota Constitution provides no
protections. Due to an apparent oversight during the 1857
constitutional conventions, there is no state constitutional right to
261
And thus far, Minnesota state restrictions on campaign
assembly.
financing and lobbying have been resolved only under the First
262
Amendment.
But the most remarkable gap is the lack of a
provision or a definitive state-constitutional interpretation
concerning defamation, one of the most important, controversial,
and confusing intersections between state tort law and
263
constitutional law.
In defamation decisions spanning three centuries, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has barely mentioned the state
constitution despite article I, section 3’s specific provision that
speakers and the press are to be “responsible for the abuse” of their
264
speech.
The court has bowed to federal law, including the
barring telemarketers from using automatic dialing machines unless the
telephone subscriber consented to receive the messages or a live operator
preceded the prerecorded message. MINN. STAT. § 325E.27 (1992).
260. Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284, 1285, 1287-88 (Or. 1993).
261. At the conventions, Democrats and Republicans included peacefulassembly provisions in their versions of the constitution, but the document
emerging from conference committee contained no such provision and “no one
chanced to notice the omission and the constitution was adopted without
guaranteeing this right.” MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 7, at 2; accord ANDERSON, supra note 76, at 118; cf. WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (right
to assemble and petition). A Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission
convened in 1971 recommended that a freedom of assembly provision be added,
but a provision was not added. See Comments on the Restructured Constitution of 1974,
in 1 MINN. STAT. ANN., supra note 77, at 129, 138.
262. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (invalidating 1993
alterations to state campaign finance laws under First Amendment); Minn. State
Ethical Practices Bd. v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 761 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986) (holding that Minnesota law requiring lobbyists to
register does not violate First Amendment right of association).
263. “The law of defamation is a complex mix of competing interests, and has
not been viewed by legal scholars as either rational or clear in application . . . .”
Bolton v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 540 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn. 1995).
264. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; accord WIS. CONST. art I, § 3 (addressing criminal
libel actions); see also RABBAN, supra note 183, at 155 (explaining that provision
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“actual malice” standard from New York Times v. Sullivan, or has
avoided constitutional issues altogether by turning to statutory or
266
common law.
But the New York Times principles came from state
267
which in Minnesota protected good-faith
defamation law,
defamatory statements against public officials decades before New
268
York Times was decided.
Because defamation, like obscenity and commercial speech,
increasingly occurs across and without regard to jurisdictional
boundaries, relying solely on the state constitution to resolve
269
defamation cases seems unwise. But if the United States Supreme
addressing abuse of speech right is “often invoked in libel and contempt cases” in
other states).
265. The Court held that the First Amendment requires a showing of “actual
malice” before a state may use tort law to prevent or punish criticism of public
officials. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964); see also Beatty v.
Republican Herald Publ’g Co., 189 N.W.2d 182, 184, 291 Minn. 34, 37 (1971)
(“State laws of libel and slander were drastically curtailed by the case of Sullivan vs.
New York Times.”); Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitution, First
Amendment Limitation on the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander, 3 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1977). Minnesota is not unique in bowing to federal law: “the
briefs and literature rarely, if ever, mention the state constitutions.” Linde, supra
note 27, at 384.
266. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 675 (Minn.
2003) (requiring a newspaper reporter, under section 595.025 of Minnesota
Statutes, to disclose the identity of a confidential source in a defamation action to
which reporter was not a party); Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 648-49,
652-54 (Minn. 2003) (referencing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)); Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 327-329
(Minn. 2000) (tracing federal history of defamation law); Richie v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 27-28 (Minn. 1996); Diesen v. Hessburg, 455
N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990) (“While first amendment and other policy
considerations underlie this restraint [against punishing even some defamatory
statements], we note our decision here is rooted in state defamation law.”).
267. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.20 (citing state decisions including Friedell v.
Blakely Printing Co., 203 N.W. 974, 975, 163 Minn. 226, 230 (1925)).
268. Friedell, 203 N.W. at 975, 163 Minn. at 231 (1925); see also Note, supra note
265, at 114 (observing that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan did not have large impact in
the state “because Minnesota had adopted, decades before, a rule giving special
protection to criticism of public officials”).
269. See, e.g., Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 906 (2003). In Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not permit
enforcement of an Alabama defamation judgment against a Minnesota defendant
who had posted allegedly defamatory remarks about an Alabama resident on an
internet newsgroup. Id. at 530, 536. The court determined that Alabama did not
have personal jurisdiction over the Minnesota defendant: “The fact that messages
posted to the newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have
been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice to establish Alabama as the focal
point of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 536.
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Court begins dismantling New York Times and its progeny, article I,
section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution should be used to ensure
that Minnesotans may “freely speak, write and publish their
270
sentiments” on public officials and public concerns.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Constitution’s provisions on speech and
religion protected Minnesotans decades before the First
Amendment did. But when faced with a state constitutional claim
involving religion or speech, the state’s courts too often ignore the
constitution’s plain language to focus their analyses on the elusive
“framers’ intent” and the arguably irrelevant inquiry of whether
there is sound reason to depart from the First Amendment.
But shifts in First Amendment ideology are lurking, and the
Establishment Clause risks becoming a miasma. Rewind to 1990,
when the United States Supreme Court redefined parameters of
the Free Exercise Clause and the Minnesota Supreme Court led the
271
nation by wielding its state constitution in response.
The
Minnesota Constitution’s plain language protecting speech should
no longer be ignored. For guidance, Minnesota might look to
Oregon, where the state constitution’s “sweeping” independent
272
protection for expression was recently reaffirmed.
It is time for
the mist to lift and the “renaissance of constitutional recognition”
that Judge Nordby described in 2002 to spread to cases involving
establishment of religion and speech.
270. New York has taken this tack. See Immuno AG v. J. Moor-Jankowski, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 1281 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
271. See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 854, 854 n.69 (1992) (observing that “[s]ome state
courts will do no better than the federal courts, but some will do much better”—
including, judging by Hershberger and French, the Minnesota Supreme Court);
McConnell, supra note 16, at 1417 (observing in 1990 article that “legitimacy of
[free exercise] doctrine has increasingly come under attack, and the survival of
the principle of free exercise exemptions is very much in doubt”).
272. The Oregon Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a two-part test for
determining whether a law violates the state constitution’s speech provision: (1)
does the law restrain or restrict speech or expression, and if so (2) is it not
protected because it is “wholly confined within some historical exception that was
well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were
adopted”? State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 621 (Or. 2005) (citing State v.
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1983)); see also City of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121
P.3d 639, 643-44 (Or. 2005). But article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution
must be distinguished because it commands that “[n]o law shall be passed
restraining the free expression of opinion,” thereby requiring state action.
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